RESOURCING FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF): SHOULD RESPONSIBILITIES BE PASSED FROM USSOCOM BACK TO THE SERVICES?
The current policy of separate resourcing and budget authority for special operations forces began with Public Law 99-661 enacted in November 1986. This law, commonly referred to as the Nunn-Cohen Amendment, called for a new unified command for special operations forces (SOF) and a new budget category and process for this new command. 1 This new command was established as US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) on 16 April 1987, 2 with the responsibility to "develop strategy, doctrine, and tactics; train assigned forces; conduct specialized courses of instruction…; validate requirements; establish priorities; ensure combat readiness; prepare budget requests…; and otherwise promote SOF professionalism. Additionally, CINCSOC was responsible for monitoring the preparedness of special operations forces assigned to other unified combatant commands." 3 In other words, USSOCOM was established primarily as a force provider with the service-like responsibilities to organize, train, and equip SOF worldwide.
In 2003 USSOCOM was designated as the lead command for fighting the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT). 4 This lead role includes, "as the supported Commander, USSOCOM must synchronize DOD efforts…and focus SOF on the GWOT… to accomplish our main effort of attacking terrorist networks and enabling partner nations to do so in concert with us." 5 These new responsibilities focus USSOCOM as a primary "warfighting command" in the war on terrorism. 6 This addition of the primary role for USSOCOM as a warfighting command has associated risks, in that USSOCOM is still a primary force provider. These competing responsibilities each provide the potential of distracting the command's leadership and staff from its other responsibilities or diluting the command's focus from the role as a primary warfighter.
This paper will investigate the policy of separate resourcing for special operations forces and the implications for U.S. Special Operations Command and the strategy in fighting the war on terrorism. Additionally it will evaluate the risks and costs associated with the current policy of separate resourcing and propose policy options or courses of action to mitigate these potential risks. Finally, this brief review will argue that separate resourcing for SOF has been essential in creating the world class special operations force we have today and that passing this responsibility back to the services would pose too great a long term risk to SOF and future SOF capability. Although possibly politically difficult, this paper will recommend an increase to USSOCOM's Management Headquarters Activities ceiling and additional manpower to mitigate the risk associated with the dual roles of force provider and warfighter.
Background -Why Separate Resourcing For SOF?
In order to properly evaluate the available policy options, one must explore the circumstances and reasons for the current policy, determine if these circumstances and reasons still exist or are valid, and ensure lessons learned from past experience are incorporated into current policy alternatives. To that end we must start with an examination of the current policy and the circumstances and environment that drove the policy selection to begin with.
The special operations capability in the US Armed Forces reached a peak during the Vietnam War and played a prominent role in operations in Vietnam. 7 After 1975 and in the defense drawdown of the post-Vietnam era, the services made dramatic cuts to the special operations force structure. These cuts included reducing nine Army Special Forces Groups to three, Navy SEAL units were cut to half strength, and many special operations aircraft were scheduled for deactivation. 8 This represented a drop in funding for SOF to a level of about onetenth of one percent of total DOD funding. 9 Theater Special Operations Commands. 26 In other words, the command's primary focus was toward being a force provider with Title 10 responsibilities to organize, train, and equip. The new dual responsibility role reflected in Figure 1 is unique in the Department of Defense. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act specifically separated the responsibilities to organize, train and equip forces from the responsibilities for planning and executing operations. In essence, the services (force providers) were removed from the operational aspect of military advice to the NCA and the chain of command. As noted in the Phase 2 report from Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, the act gave Combatant Commanders responsibility for operations and "clear authorities for planning and conducting assigned missions." 28 However, the report also noted that "the COCOMs' role in the requirements and acquisition process is still insufficient," indicating that an expanded role for the COCOMs' in resourcing capabilities was warranted. 29 This duality of roles for USSOCOM presents a dichotomous focus for the command and for the leadership. Is the primary role and mission of USSOCOM as a warfighter or is it as a force provider? These two roles are generally mutually exclusive and certainly provide one of the greatest risks for this new dual responsibility role, with Title 10 responsibilities pulling focus in one direction and warfighting responsibilities pulling focus in another. 31 The SOF force structure at that time had grown to a total of about 44,000. 32 By FY1999, the SOF Force structure had grown to just over 46,000 and the budget request of $3.4
billion represented approximately 1.3 percent of the total DoD budget. 33 The SOF force structure had stabilized at about this level through 2001, with the end strength just under 46,000 and a FY2001 budget request of $3.7 billion again representing 1.3 percent of the total DoD budget. 34 After 9/11 and the designation of USSOCOM as the lead in the GWOT, SOF funding and force structure expanded significantly. In the FY2006 budget request, the planned end strength will be at just over 52,000 and the funding request for $6.5 billion represents a growth to 1.6 percent of the total DoD budget. He also noted that there had been modest increases in the headquarters with the creation of the Center for Special Operations and the other growth within the SOF force structure in general. 44 The inference here is that OSD will increase the MHA ceiling for USSOCOM once the ceilings are again enforced. This assumption could be problematic in the future-only time will tell the eventual makeup of MHA allocations in USSOCOM, across the services, and within the department.
As to the question, should the current policy be changed? The answer must be considered by evaluating available policy options and weighing the risks associated with those policy options against the risks associated with the current policies. Certainly there are risks associated with the dual responsibilities of resourcing SOF and acting as the SOF force provider. However, there are also risks associated with passing the resourcing responsibility back to the services. The question of whether to change the policy is probably best answered by evaluating policy options to reduce or mitigate the risks against the risks of the status quo.
Now that all the policy considerations of limited headquarters authorizations, dual responsibility focus, redundant headquarters manpower and results for SOF are in focus, it's time to articulate and evaluate alternative policy options.
Alternative Policy Options -How Can The Risks Be Mitigated?
With the framework laid for the desired policy goal-adequate resourcing and advocacy for special operations capability and meeting all the warfighter responsibilities for the GWOT, one can explore policy options that may meet the policy goal and mitigate the potential risks highlighted above.
Each of these policy options should be viewed in terms of ends, ways, and means with each option evaluated for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. This evaluation should answer these basic questions: feasibility (Can the policy goals or ends be achieved with the means available?); acceptability (Are the costs for the strategy or option justified?); and finally suitability (Can the strategy or option achieve the desired effect or end?).
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Option 1 -Return full resourcing responsibility to the services. The first policy option to explore is to return full Title 10 resourcing responsibility for SOF back to the services. This would entail reversing the legislation giving budget authority to USSOCOM. This option would allow the USSOCOM leadership and staff to focus solely on the GWOT-one of the nations top priorities. 46 Additionally, removing responsibility for the resourcing function would allow headquarters manpower authorizations to be applied to the functions of the unified command in a warfighting role. Clearly this policy option proposes to mitigate the risks associated with inefficient use of limited headquarters manpower authorizations and the loss of focus on the primary mission-the GWOT. The stated policy goal to maintain advocacy and oversight of SOF capabilities would have to be filled by continuing the roles of ASD/SOLIC as the civilian overseer and USSOCOM as the SOF unified combatant command. Additionally, SOF requirements would still be vetted through USSOCOM and passed to the services for resourcing-just as the other unified combatant commanders compete to have their top priorities and requirements met in the current DoD resourcing system. However, this policy option comes with significant other risks of its own. The greatest risk for this option is that of a return to the service resourcing priorities of the past where SOF funding was cut in favor of conventional force programs. We can't forget the warning of Noel Koch, former DASD, that SOF programs have never been in the "traditional core" for the services and would remain on the periphery. 47 This risk would certainly be mitigated in the short term since SOF and USSOCOM are the lead for the GWOT and are receiving unprecedented attention for that increase in responsibility. SOF are experiencing unprecedented recognition and resourcing as evidenced by the almost 13 percent growth in force structure and the increase in annual obligation authority from $3.7 billion to $6.5 billion from the pre-9/11 FY2001 budget to the FY06 budget. 48 This first option, to return full Title 10 resourcing responsibility for SOF to the services, proposes no change to the overall resources or means employed by the department. However, this option proposes a change to the method of applying the means or ways to achieve the ends. In this case, this option appears to fall short in the acceptability and suitability tests.
Acceptability is questionable because of the increased risk (or cost) to the future viability of SOF that would most certainly be at risk in the long term. This option fails the suitability test because the stated policy goal to maintain a credible, capable joint SOF capability into the future comes into question without any resourcing authority separate from the service departments.
General Brown noted in his recent JFQ article that the authorities assigned to USSOCOM, specifically program and budget authority among others, has led to a profound impact on special operations capabilities. "USSOCOM has galvanized all joint Special Operations capabilities into a world-class force with the skill to execute the most challenging missions. The command has been willing to utilize these authorities to continuously reevaluate the SOF mission, force structure, organization, and virtually every aspect of the USSOCOM construct, and to change where necessary to meet the latest threat."
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Colonel Brendan Clare, USSOCOM Assessment Director for the Fixed Wing Assessment Area, noted the Air Force's capability focus is generally toward the high end major combat operations (MCO) end of the spectrum and that SOF requirements to modify and deliver specialized platforms for specific mission sets don't match very well with overall Air Force focus.
He opines this mismatch would absolutely lead to a decrease in investment resources for SOF unique mobility programs which would be turned over to the Air Force in this option. 50 The current USSOCOM Senior Assessment Director, Colonel James L. Dunn, concluded that if SOF resourcing responsibility were returned to the services, their conventional force priorities would take much of the focus and resources and that "service priorities would eventually result in a decrease in resources for SOF." This second option, a partial transfer of resourcing responsibility and functions to the services with ultimate approval by the USSOCOM Commander, also proposes no change to the overall resources or means employed. Again, only a change to the method of applying the means or ways to achieve the ends is proposed. This option most probably passes the acceptability and feasibility tests, as the policy goals could be met without significant change in costs. However, the suitability test falls short for this option. While the overall policy goals might be met with this option, the primary goal to mitigate risk and save manpower by transferring workload to the services most likely could not be achieved.
The manpower savings attributable to transferring programming workload to the services preformed by the services to determine if SOF requirements were being fulfilled. 54 In other words much of the program evaluation work now preformed on the USSOCOM staff would continue and the additional requirement to monitor the work accomplished by the service staffs would more than offset any savings generated by transferring the program integration workload.
Additionally the POM and budget approval processes as they currently exist with Board of Directors meetings and briefings most probably would be required to provide an informed decision making process for the commander. 55 While this option at first glance would seem to mitigate some of the risks of dual force provider and warfighter responsibilities, the ultimate outcome would preclude any risk mitigation because of the additional workload requirements generated by the transfer. Additionally this option would require a resourcing approach where each of the USSOCOM components requirements are addressed separately by each service department. This approach would be a step back from the joint SOF capability analysis and program integration that exists under the current processes within the command. Operations, the warfighting function within USSOCOM. This reduction could result in a situation where the headquarters is inadequately staffed to perform the required functions of both force provider and warfighter. Although this risk may seem relatively low in the short term, it cold lead to a difficult balance for the command between inadequately resourcing either the force provider responsibility or the warfighting responsibility. This final option proposes no change to the desired ends, ways used or means employed and would accept any risks associated with the current policy. This option would fall short in the feasibility area in that the desired ends could not adequately be achieved with the means available if the MHA ceilings are enforced on USSOCOM. Without an increase in resources or a change in the ways (methods employed), the current policy maintains the risk of splitting the USSOCOM staff between the two primary functions of force provider and warfighter.
Conclusions and Recommendations.
Any policy recommendation has to be viewed in terms of the organizational needs one is trying to satisfy. In this case, as a dedicated SOF warrior, these recommendations are those most likely and prudent to be pursued by USSOCOM to meet its needs within the context of the current DoD environment.
The first and most obvious conclusion is that removing or adjusting separate resourcing for SOF would not benefit the maintenance of joint SOF capabilities required by the nation. The world-class special operations capabilities built over the last 20 years have been the result of the separate acquisition and budget authority vested in the USSOCOM Combatant
Commander. The first two options evaluated above would dilute this authority and pose serious risks for the future health of the SOF capabilities that exist today. Although these options would seek to reduce the risk associated with the dual responsibilities of force provider and warfighter, the ultimate result would be a less capable SOF community and a far greater risk than the risk sought to mitigate.
The second obvious conclusion from this evaluation is that the initial legislation initiating separate resourcing for SOF placed USSOCOM in the primary role as a force provider-unique for a combatant command. This primary role as a force provider places additional risks on the combatant commander in the role as a warfighter, especially without a significant increase in resources intended to adequately address both roles for the command. The dual roles for the combatant commander create competing areas of focus such as the pull between resourcing the short term fight and the long term health of the force highlighted by Mr. Scott Stephens. A combatant commander's need to apply resources to the fight on the battlefield competes with the need for a long term focus to resource the future fight beyond the current threat. This risk, the competition between short and long term, is not the primary focus on this paper, but can and should be addressed within the command's strategic planning process (SPP). 58 The question remains: how great is the risk associated with this dual role competition and should anything be changed? From a strict ends, ways, and means point of view, an increase in the workload and responsibilities for the command would require an increase in the means employed or a decrease in the expected ends. Since the desired ends (effective prosecution of the GWOT and maintaining a capable SOF) have not changed, the only remaining viable option to mitigate the risk is an increase in manpower and MHA to adequately discharge the assigned responsibilities.
Bottom line recommendation: USSOCOM should pursue Option 3, headquarters manpower and MHA increase, as the primary solution to mitigate the risk to prosecuting the GWOT. The added responsibilities associated with the dual roles as warfighter and force provider should be adequately resourced by the department (most probably from within the already planned SOF expansion). The associated MHA ceilings for USSOCOM should also be increased to allow for the modest growth required to match the added responsibilities.
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